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TOPIC IV.B.1

WILLIAM B. FISCH & RICHARD S. KAY

The Legitimacy of the Constitutional Judge and
Theories of Interpretation in the United States
The paper addresses the sources of legitimacy of a judge exercising the power to declare acts of government invalid on constitutional
grounds, and their relationship to theories of interpretation of the
constitutional texts.
In perhaps no other country is the legitimacy of the constitutional judge a more important issue than in the United States. Constitutional judicial review of acts of the government has had, and
continues to have, a profound effect on the extent and character of
public action. The constitutional decisions of the courts govern, to a
significant degree, some of the most intensely controversial questions
of public policy. American courts actively police the role of government with respect to criminal conduct and punishment, racial discrimination and remedies for such discrimination, and the regulation
of reproductive and sexual matters, among. many other subjects. It
is, in fact, fair to say the judicial penetration of many of these topics
has been so complete that the very agenda of public concerns is, in
substantial measure, defined by the process of litigation and judicial
decision.
What legitimates this critical exercise of public power? The word
"legitimacy" has been used for a number of purposes, ranging from
service as a synonym for conformity to positive law, to identification
of the intrinsic moral rightness of an action. We mean by legitimacy
that quality of an action or decision that causes it to be accepted as
authoritative by the human beings who are in a position to act in
response to it. That is, we use the term to describe a quality of a legal
action within a political and social context.1 Given this definition,
there is little doubt that the Supreme Court of the United States, as
WILLIAM B. FISCH is Isador Loeb Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
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the principal constitutional tribunal, exercises legitimate authority.
The very success of the Court in altering public decisionmaking is
powerful evidence of its acceptance. The difficulty, as will be made
clear, is identifying the source and character of that legitimacy.
It is useful at the outset to restate some basic principles of judicial constitutional review in American law - "givens" in the debate
over legitimacy, to which the competing theories refer with satisfaction or dismay - to provide the setting for a discussion of interpretive theory. Our concern in this paper will be the federal
constitution, and the work of the United States Supreme Court as the
court of last resort for constitutional questions for both state and federal judicial systems. They are not the only "constitutional judges,"
however; each of the 50 constituent states has its own constitution,
its own complete judicial system, and its own method of selecting
judges. 2 All judges must apply the federal constitution to cases
before them, 3 and each state judiciary exercises a parallel power
under its own constitution. 4 The concept of "constitutional judge" in
the United States, therefore, is a complex one. 5

I.

THE JUDICIAL POWER OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: THE

A.

BASIC FRAMEWORK

Concrete, not Abstract Review

The U.S. Constitution does not provide expressly for judicial constitutional review, nor is the implication from its language overwhelming. 6 Nonetheless it was assumed by most participants in the
2. Only three states (all among the original thirteen) still follow the federal
model of permanent appointment; all others utilize limited terms and some form of
electoral selection or review, such as direct partisan election, nonpartisan election,
initial appointment followed by periodic nonpartisan retention election, and the like.
For details, see Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, tables 4.1, 4.2
and 4.4 (1992).
3. Art. VI par. 2, the so-called supremacy clause:
This Constitution, and the Law of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof.. shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
4. For a review of the process of consolidating this consensus, see Thayer, "The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," 7 Harv. L. Rev.
129, 132 ff. (1893).
5. To be sure, lower federal judges and state court judges appear, when applying
the federal constitution, predominantly in the common-law mode of reliance upon
precedents of the Supreme Court, see Levinson, "On Positivism and Potted Plants:
'Inferior' Judges and the Task of Constitutional Intepretation," 25 Conn. L. Rev. 843
(1993). However, the Court's decisions themselves are incomplete and in need of interpretation, so that the room for exercise of judgment by these other judges is often
large.
6. See, for example, Alexander Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch 1-13 (1962).
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drafting 7 and ratification 8 of the original document that some such

power would exist under the text as proposed. 9 More precise contours of it were elaborated by the Court in the first third of the 19th
century under Chief Justice Marshall. In Marbury v. Madison' the
Court struck down an Act of Congress which was interpreted to give

the Court itself competence over certain cases which were not contemplated for it in Art. III §2. In doing so the Court enunciated a
seemingly straightforward rationale for the power: (1) the Constitu-

tion is intended to be law which binds all other government agencies
as well as the courts; (2) an essential function of courts is to determine what the law is, in order to decide cases properly before them;
and (3) therefore the Court must apply the Constitution, as the highest law in the system, in place of any inconsistent statute or governmental act. 1 '
An important corollary of this reasoning is that the Constitution
(like other law) is judicially applicable, at least in the federal courts,
only in concrete cases in which the constitutional issue is raised be-

12
tween parties having specific, adverse interests in its resolution.

The Supreme Court, primarily exercising prudential self-regulation
but in this century relying increasingly on the language of Art. III §2
which uses the terms "cases" and "controversies" to define the categories of the federal judicial power, 13 has developed an extensive array
7. Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 156-7
(1913); see the participants' notes collected in, Jane Butzner (ed.) Constitutional
Chaff 147-152 (1941).
8. For ratification: e.g., The Federalist No. 78, at 464 (Rossiter ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton); against ratification: "Brutus," in Herbert Storing (ed.), 2 The Complete
Anti-Federalist417 ff. (1981); see, e.g., Raoul Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court
120 ff. (1969).
9. Strongest textual inferences are drawn from Art. III § 2 cl. 1, extending the
judicial power of the U.S. to cases "arising under this Constitution", and Art. VI par.
2, the Supremacy Clause, quoted n. 3 above.
10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
11. This conception of judicial constitutional review as an integral element of the
judicial law-finding process, and of the Constitution as supreme ordinary law, drew
heavily on the English common law tradition. On the relevance of the common law
tradition to the Framers' conception of judicial review see Powell, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent," 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 894 ff. (1985). For an argument
that Marbury in this sense did indeed effect a major transformation of the earlier
understanding, in that it called for routine application of a document originally expected and intended to be enforced only as a last resort against clear violation, see
Sylvia Snowiss, JudicialReview and the Law of the Constitution(1990), critically reviewed by Newmyer in 9 Const. Comm. 126 (1992). Marbury is discussed further infra, text at notes 40 if.
12. The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 170.
13. For persuasive argument that much of this reliance on the constitutional language is misplaced from an historical perspective, see, e.g., Berger, "Standing to Sue
in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?," 78 Yale L. J. 816 (1969);
Nichol, "Ripeness and the Constitution," 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153 (1987).
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of rules of "justiciability" designed to define what types of disputes
are suitable for judicial determination, and has insisted on applying
those rules to constitutional cases as well as to all others. 14 Thus the
"abstract norm control" practiced in the modern German and French
constitutional tribunals has never been available in the federal
courts. 15 The doctrines of justiciability are highly technical and certainly not well understood in the American public, and their specific
applications often give rise to controversy and leave room for suspicion of manipulation. They are nonetheless an inescapable staple of
constitutional advocacy in the courts.
B. Selection and Retention of FederalJudges
All federal judges, including the justices of the Supreme Court,
are appointed by the President subject to the "advice and consent" of
the Senate (Art. II §2 par. 2).16 No formal qualifications are specified, though in fact full legal training has been an all but universal
requirement and most federal judges have been active to some degree
in public life. That presidents take politics into account in making
nominations is a given; in the twentieth-century, 17 the Senate has
normally deferred to presidential choice among professionally and intellectually qualified candidates, but occasionally, and particularly
with respect to Supreme Court nominees, it refuses confirmation on
the basis of the senators' perceptions of the nominees' views and/or
the style in which they are presented. 18 The most controversial rejection in recent times came in 1987 with the nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork, which gave rise to an enormous partisan public debate not always distinguished by accuracy on either side - centered not
only on his well-documented and widely published "originalist" theory of constitutional interpretation but'also, perhaps more promi14. For a general treatment see John Nowak & Ronald Rotunda, Constitutional
Law § 2.12 (4th ed. 1991). These are principles governing the jurisdiction of all federal courts; the Supreme Court itself is unique, in that even within this framework its
appellate jurisdiction is now entirely discretionary, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257
(1988).
15. Certain state courts, however, are empowered to render advisory opinions.
See, e.g., Mass. Const. Part II, ch. 3, art. 2.
16. The Senate is the upper house of the federal legislature, consisting of 2 senators from each state elected by popular vote, with 6-year terms.
17. The Senate was much less passive in the constitution's first century, rejecting
25% of those nominated, see Freund, "Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1146, 1146-51 (1988); Monaghan, "The Confirmation
Process: Law or Politics?," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1202 (1988).
18. See Henry Abraham, Justices and Presidents:A Political History of Appointments to the Supreme Court (2d ed. 1985); Simson, "Taking the Court Seriously: A
Proposed Approach to Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees," 7 Const.
Comm. 283 (1990); Ely, "Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in
a World Where Courts Are No Different Than Legislatures," 77 Va. L. Rev. 833, 86978 (1991).
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nently, on his application of that theory to criticize particular Court
decisions. 19
The Constitution specifies in Art. III §1 that federal judges serve
"during good Behavior" and that their salaries cannot be diminished
while in office. These were explicitly intended to protect the judges
against undue political influence. 20 Removal of a federal judge can
only 21 be accomplished by the cumbersome method of impeachment
(Art. II §4), in which the House of Representatives makes charges of
"treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors" and the
Senate sits in judgment on those charges. A total of seven lower federal court judges -including three in the last 10 years - have been
removed by this process, almost always for misconduct or gross incompetence; 22 only one Supreme Court justice has been formally
23
charged ("impeached") and none has been convicted.
C. CongressionalControl of Federal Court Jurisdiction
A further explicit parameter of the power of judicial constitutional review is the power of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Art. III contains two provisions granting such
power: first, the power to create lower federal courts (§1), which is
understood to imply complete control over their jurisdiction, 2 4 and
19. For a sampling of the debate, including texts of the presidential and congressional reports on the nomination, see "The Bork Nomination," 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1-530
(1989); for a sampling of more scholarly discussion of the appointment process and the
role of ideology, see Symposium: "Confirmation Controversy: The Selection of a
Supreme Court Justice," 84 Northwestern L. Rev. 832-1046 and 1121-1228 (1990).
The judge's own popular defense of his positions and critique of the nomination process, Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
(1990), received multiple reviews in the Northwestern Law Review symposium cited
above, among which see Kay, "The Bork Nomination and the Definition of 'The Constitution'," id. at 1190.
20. See The FederalistNo. 78, supra n. 8, at p. 465.
21. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 732, 738-9 (1993), citing Federalist81:
. . .(J)udicial review [of impeachment proceedings] would be inconsistent
with the Framers' insistence that our system be one of checks and balances.
In our constitutional system, impeachment was designed to be the only check
on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature ... [Judge] Nixon's argument
would place final reviewing authority with respect to impeachments in the
hands of the same body that the impeachment process is designed to
regulate.
22. On the recent impeachments of Judges Claiborne (felony tax evasion), Hastings (bribery and perjury) and Nixon (perjury), see 1 Ronald Rotunda & John Nowak,
Treatise on ConstitutionalLaw 119-21 (2d ed. 1992).
23. On the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1803-5, see Rauol Berger,
Impeachment: The ConstitutionalProblems, ch. VIII (1973); George Haskins and Herbert Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall 1801-15, ch. VII (History of the
Supreme Court of the United States, vol. II, 1981).
24. See Martin Redish, FederalJurisdiction29 (2d ed. 1990). For the view that at
least several categories of jurisdiction under Art. III § 2, particularly those denominated "cases", may not be removed entirely from the federal judiciary - an argument
made by Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) but never
embraced by the Court in a holding - see Amar, "A Neo-Federalist View of Article
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second, the power to make exceptions to and regulations of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (§2 par. 2). In fact Congress
has seldom exercised these powers to restrict or correct an exercise of
the power of constitutional review as such;25 but a statute was sustained in the 19th century which removed a specific case already
pending before the Court and was almost certainly motivated by the
26
expected judicial result.
D. Amendment of the Text
Finally one must note the extraordinarily difficult amendment
process set forth in Art. V of the Constitution. It requires that proposals for amendment be made either by Congress directly or by a
convention called by Congress on application from the states; but
Congress must propose by a two-thirds majority in each house, and
the application for a convention must be made by two thirds of the
states. No successful application for a constitutional convention has
yet been made, and the process is often seen as so fraught with legal
uncertainties 2 7 - exemplified by the runaway character of the Convention that produced the original document itself 28 - that many
have sought to preempt or otherwise avoid it if at all possible. Ratification or formal approval of proposed amendments - the ultimate
democratic sanction which might be understood to legitimate an
amendment despite any irregularities in the proposal process 2 9 - requires a still greater majority of the states, namely three fourths.
The process has been successful only 18 times in 200 years, producing
27 articles of amendment.
Of the amendments four can be seen as directly corrective of controversial Supreme Court decisions: the 11th, excluding federal court
jurisdiction over suits brought by citizens of one state against another state;3 0 the 14th (§1 cl. 1), providing a minimum definition of
national and state citizenship; 3 1 the 16th, authorizing the federal
III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction," 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985);
Engdahl, "What's In A Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple Supreme Courts," 66
Ind. L. J. 457, 478-9 n.111 (1991).
25. On the proposition that Congress may not use the jurisdiction-limiting power
to impose its own view of the Constitution, see Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 14, § 2.9.
26. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
27. For an argument that the modem uncertainties were not present in the historical practice contemplated by the Framers, see Russell Caplan, Constitutional
Brinksmanship (1988), critically reviewed by Kay, 7 Const. Comm. 434 (1990).
28. It was originally called to consider amendments to its predecessor the Articles
of Confederation, and therefore clearly exceeded its mandate, see, e.g., Kay, "The Illegality of the Constitution," 4 Const. Comm. 57 (1987).
29. On the legitimating role of the original ratification process see, e.g., Kay,
supra n. 28, at 74-5, with further references.
30. It reversed Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419 (1793).
31. It reversed, after a bloody civil war, the most controversial decision of all:
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which held inter alia that a
black person was incapable under the Constitution of becoming a U.S. citizen.
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government to impose an income tax; 32 and the 26th, prohibiting discrimination against persons 18 years old or older with respect to vot33
ing rights.

II.

THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION

A.

The Constitution as the Source of Judicial Legitimacy

At the center of this system is the Constitution itself, and it is
the Constitution that provides the most obvious source of legitimacy
for the exercise of constitutional judicial review. The bulk of this report will be devoted to the various ways in which the courts and academic commentators have defined the relationship between the
Constitution and the process of judical decision. As a background to
that discussion, however, it may be useful to consider the character of
that relationship in more general terms, as well as its role in establishing the legitimacy of judicial review.
Robert Bork suggested, in connection with the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court, that "the way an institution advertises
tells you what it thinks its customers demand." 34 If so, the centrality
of the constitutional text in establishing the legitimacy of the Court's
judgments is obvious. No matter how contestable the Court's decision, and no matter how little the Constitution's text or history appears actually to have been employed in its reasoning, the
Constitution is always cited as the controlling source of judgment.
The legitimacy of that written Constitution of 1787-89 as
amended, is itself a largely unquestioned postulate of the American
political and legal system. With very few exceptions, to acknowledge
that the Constitution provides a rule of decision in a particular con-

32. It reversed Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
33. It reversed Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), which had held that Congress lacked power to impose such restrictions on the states by legislation.
34. Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," 47 Ind. L.
J. 1, 4 (1971).
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troversy is to conclude the argument. 3 5 Constitution-worship in the
36
United States has a long history.
The attitude of much of American society to the Constitution was
apparent a few years ago in the national observation of the two hundredth anniversary of its writing and ratification. That founding
event was sometimes commemorated in terms that would not have
been inappropriate to describe an act of divine lawgiving. At the
principal celebration in Philadelphia on September 17, 1987, President Reagan said the Constitution was a human covenant "and beyond that a covenant with the Supreme Being to whom our Founding
Fathers did constantly appeal for assistance."3 7 The indubitable
rightness of the constitutional rules was regularly reiterated. Many
seized the chance to quote Gladstone's description of the Constitution
as "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the
brain and purpose of man." 38 And lest it be thought that it was anything apart from the constitutional text itself which was the center of
such homage, the country was flooded with millions-of pocket sized
copies of the Constitution and people were enjoined to read and study
it.39

The legitimacy of the constitutional judge, therefore, seems
largely parasitic on the self-evident legitimacy of the Constitution,
35. See Maltz, "The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue," 5
Const. Comm. 375, 388 (1981). The major exceptions to this almost universal concession to the political legitimacy of the constitutional text have been founded on questions of race. In the years preceding the Civil War many of the opponents of slavery,
quite rightly, pointed out that the Constitution was tainted by its barely masked accommodation of that pernicious institution. See Phillip Paludan, A Covenant with
Death: The Constitution, Law & Equality in The Civil War Era (1975). More recently, Justice Thurgood Marshall injected a skeptical and critical note in the otherwise bland and self-congratulatory atmosphere of the bicentennial anniversary of the
Constitution by recalling this major moral blemish on the creation of that document.
Taylor, "Marshall Sounds Critical Note on Bicentennial," New York Times, May 7,
1987, p. Al col 4.
36. See generally Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American History (1980).
37. Remarks at the "We the People" Bicentennial Celebration in Philadelphia
Pennsylvania, September 17, 1987, 2 Public Papers of the President of the United
States: Ronald Reagan 1043, 1044 (1989). The divine origin of the Constitution is a
persistent theme in American political history. See Kammen, supra n. 36, at 225 n.
17.
38. See, e.g., Twardy, "Conn. Opinion: Learning & Living the Constitution," New
York Times, June 7, 1987, sec. 11CN36, p. 36, col. 1. Gladstone's remark was published in Gladstone, "Kin Beyond the Sea," 127 North Amer. Rev. 179, 185 (September-October 1978).
39. The Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court in a bicentennial speech said
that "we owe it to ourselves and our families to know more about [the Constitution], to
know it, to understand it and above all live up to it. If we would burn these truths
into the hearts of every American we would all be enriched." United Press International wire story, Sept. 18, 1987, available in NEXIS Archive file. On the distribution
of copies of the Constitution, see Vobejda, "Year of the Constitution: A Different Sort
of Party: Event Taking Hold on Grass-Roots America," The Washington Post, January 2, 1987, p. Al.
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and interpretation of the text is the means by which the judge is legitimated. This essential connection was nicely captured in the judgment of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, which
grounded that authority on the necessity of executing the commands
of the Constitution. Once the postulates were accepted that the Constitution is applicable law and superior to any inconsistent rule of
ordinary law,40 everything else followed from the interpretive role of
courts:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both
the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so
that the courts must either decide that case conformably to
the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to the
Constitution disregarding the law; the court must determine
which of these conflicting rules govern the case. This is the
very essence of the judicial duty. If, then the courts are to
regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.4 1
The role of the judiciary in this scheme, it will be noted, is auxiliary. The Constitution itself extends the judicial power to cases "arising under... the Constitution," and Marshall noted that this grant
assumes that the Constitution will be relevant to the decision of some
cases. "And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or obey?" 42 The Constitution directs the judges to take an
oath to support it but, Marshall asked, how can they uphold this oath
if it does not govern the decision of the cases brought before them?
"How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the
instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they
43
swear to support!"
The sum of these arguments is that the system of law established
by the Constitution demands that the judges regard themselves as
the agencies whereby the decisions embodied in that document are
translated into effective rules of conduct. The Constitution was to be
"a rule for the government of courts as well as of the legislature." 44
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See text at supra n. 10.
5 U.S. at 177-8 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 180 (emphasis supplied).
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The Risks of Interpretationand Misinterpretation

The conception of constitutional decisionmaking just described
posits the judge as the mere medium through which the authoritative
decisions about the limits of governmental power made in the enactment of the Constitution are worked out. Nothing could be more subversive of this model of legitimacy than the suspicion that the judge
would exercise an independent discretion under the pretense of mere
interpretation. Thomas Jefferson expressed this concern when he
said "[o]ur peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution, let us not make it a blank paper by construction." 45 Rather, to
use another figure of Jefferson, the judge must be "a mere
46
machine."
Obviously this kind of adjudication was far easier for human beings to describe than to achieve. It has been noted indeed that Marbury was an atypical instance of constitutional adjudication, because
it involved the application of a technical provision concerning the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.4 7 There it was (barely)
possible to speak with some confidence of a choice between deciding
the "case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or
conformably to the Constitution disregarding the law."48 The question necessarily appears in a different light when an official action is
challenged as "impairing the obligation of contracts" 49 or "prohibiting
the free exercise" of religion 5° or having "deprived [a person] of...
liberty... without due process of law."5 1 It is far harder, in interpreting such apparently open-ended clauses, for the constitutional judge
to be "a mere machine," suppressing any personal value or
preference.
Scholarly attacks on the judges' capacity to restrict themselves to
simple execution of the constitutional commands have been thoroughgoing. The American legal realists of the middle of the twentieth century, who discounted the governing influence of rules in
adjudication, did not spare constitutional law. They found the constitutional judge equally subject to human nature and unlikely to be
constrainable by abstract rules, even if they are embedded in a constitutional text.5 2 Perhaps even more disturbing to the Marbury
45. Quoted in Powell, supra n. 11, at 893 n.40. Further expressions of the deep
early suspicion of judicial interpretation are found in id. at 893-94.
46. Quoted in Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 at
161 (1969).
47. Grey, "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1978).

48. 5 U.S. at 178.
49. Art. I, s.10, cl.1.
50. Amend. I.
51. Amends. V and XIV § 1.
52. See Llewellyn, "The Constitution as an Institution," 24 Colum. L. Rev. 1
(1934). For a more recent example of the same kind of criticism see Chemerinsky,
"The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution," 103 Harv.
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model has been the adoption by constitutional critics of the general
doubts raised by literary theorists as to the possibility of a single,
stable discernable meaning in a text of any kind. 53 The work of the
United States Supreme Court provides ample evidence for such skepticism. The influence of the written Constitution in many of the best
known (and often most controversial) judgments of that Court is, if
present, certainly well concealed. 5 4 If the connection between the
Constitution and the results of constitutional adjudication is severed,
however, the latter is deprived of its most plausible and most commonly accepted source of legitimacy.
C.

The Absence of External Constraintson JudicialDiscretion

This loss is especially important in light of the anomalous character of the judiciary in the political-legal regime established by the
Constitution. The Constitution incorporates both structural and substantive constraints on government to prevent encroachment on liberty.55 Judicial review is an important mechanism for enforcing
those constraints on the other branches, but is not itself subject to
similar external constraints, and thus is in serious tension with the
underlying values that support the constitutional system.
The Constitution relies in at least two ways on the design and
structure of governmental institutions to minimize the likelihood of
despotic actions. First and most obvious is electoral responsibility,
the requirement that important government officials be elected for
fixed terms. The holders of state power must regularly appear before
the public to give an account of their actions and if that account is
found unsatisfactory, they are replaced. This aspect of the constitutional system necessarily inhibits the adoption or maintenance of unpopular measures. Madison, defending the proposed Constitution in
The Federalist, insisted that "a dependence upon
the people is, no
56
doubt, the primary control on the government."
A second structural constraint is often called "checks and balances". Political power was to be distributed among independent
agencies, which, if they were to act, would have to overcome mutual
jealousies and the difficulties of coordination. Madison's exposition of
the idea is well known:
L. Rev. 43, 101 (1989): "The Court should stop pretending that objective Constitutional principles exist apart from the preferences of the justices".
53. See, e.g., Levinson, "Law as Literature," 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982).
54. This is a given among commentators of all persuasions. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (1972); Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding," 60 B. U. L. Rev. 204, 223-24 (1980).
55. On the general question of substantive and structural constitutional restrictions, see Kay, "Substance and Structure as Constitutional Protections: Centennial
Comparisons," [1989] Public Law 428.
56. The FederalistNo. 51, supra n. 8, at 323.
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But the great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others . . . . Ambition must be made to
concounteract ambition. The interests of the man must be
57
nected with the constitutional restraints of the place.
This principle is worked out through the dispersal of and sharing of
the powers of the federal government among executive, legislative
and judicial branches, as well as in the vertical distribution of powers
between state and federal governments.
Beyond these structural inhibitions there are numerous substantive limitations on governmental conduct expressed or implied in the
text. There is an all-embracing limit on the authority of the federal
government, in the sense that the text provides an exclusive list of
permissible powers. Any action not attributable to a granted power
is forbidden.5 8 In addition there are specific limitations on actions
that may fall within the categorical grants. Prominent among these
limitations are those specifying individual rights to be protected
against government interference.
For the "political" branches of government, the legislative and
executive, this combination of structural and substantive constitutional restraints, many of which are enforceable by the courts, creates
a formidable barrier to abusive action. The political departments of
the government can thus be said to act legitimately when they act
within the constitutionally specified areas of competence, they do not
transgress substantive rules laid down to limit that competence, and
they make themselves accountable to people for the rightness of their
decisions.
The judicial department, by contrast, is exempted from most of
these external constraints. With respect to structural limitations,
the federal courts were intentionally designed to be insulated from
the influence of public opinion and from that of the other branches of
government. Judges, as we have noted, are appointed by the President, and need to be confirmed by the Senate, a fact which, recent
events have shown, is hardly devoid of significance. 59 But they are
nonetheless appointed and not elected. Their appointment, moreover, is a lifetime one and the political considerations which may
57. Id. at 321-2.
58. This conclusion is apparent from the historical circumstances of the creation
of the Constitution and from the textual language employed. It is made explicit in the
Tenth Amendment. It should be noted, of course, that a generous judicial construction of the granted powers has resulted in something very like plenary legislative
authority in the Congress. See Laurence Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 316-17
(1988).
59. See, e.g., Symposium, supra n. 19.
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have been apparent at the time of their nominations and confirmations, are notoriously poor indicators of their long term records on the
bench. Once appointed, their compensation, by explicit constitutional
rule, may not be reduced. 60 They may be removed from office by impeachment and conviction in the Congress and the use of this power
is not unknown. But, as we have seen, it is an extraordinarily difficult process and is pretty much reserved for instances of personal impropriety, not for merely politically obnoxious uses of judicial
power. 6 1 The judges are thus substantially relieved of that need to
account for their official behavior which is assumed to be an essential
element of the legitimacy of the decisions of other public officials. Indeed an apolitical, independent and impartial judiciary was understood to be indispensable to the proper functioning of the legal
system.
More importantly for this discussion, the judiciary was understood not to be in need of the kind of structural constraints imposed
on the other branches, because those represented limitations on the
power to make policy choices, a function from which the judiciary
were to be excluded. The courts were the mere executors of decisions,
in the shape of legal rules, made by other political actors. Hamilton's
remarks in The Federalist are again illustrative. The judiciary, he
remarked, "may truly be said to have neither force nor will but
merely judgment." Permanent judicial tenure was necessary, he
noted, because, in a free government, the laws must be numerous,
and the task of applying them commensurately laborious, requiring
expertise and experience. Such detail in the legal material was necessary because
to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they be bound down by strict rules and precedents
that serve to define and point out their duty in every particu62
lar case that comes before them.
Hamilton was not referring primarily to constitutional adjudication,
to be sure, and the sometimes sweeping breadth of the constitutional
text must necessarily qualify the application of this dictum to the
constitutional judge. But his injunction is strongly indicative of a
traditional American hostility to discretion in adjudication, 63 an attitude highly relevant to the legitimacy of judicial review.
60. Art. III §1.
61. In 1970, Gerald Ford, then a member of the House of Representatives, suggested an inquiry into the impeachment of William 0. Douglas, then a justice of the
United States Supreme Court. Ford's much reported contention that an "impeachable
offense" is "whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at
a given moment in history" was widely and vigorously criticized. See Gerhardt, "The
Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and the Alternatives," 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 82-83
(1989).
62. Id. at 471.
63. See Powell, supra n. 11, at 891-94.
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The failure of these limitations may be of no great importance
when we are dealing with sub-constitutional adjudication, where unacceptable judicial decisions may be overturned by a sufficiently persistent executive and legislature. As a practical matter, however,
there are no reliable external remedies when the United States
Supreme Court acts unconstitutionally in the course of constitutional
adjudication. 6 4 Compliance with the norms of the Constitution must
be the result of personal commitment by the judges themselves.
The legitimacy of judicial review thus appears to hinge on a
broad social conviction that the constitutional judges act, in some
sense, according to the Constitution. An extra-constitutional reliance
on a mandate from the popular will has, for reasons noted, been carefully precluded. Skepticism about the foundations of that societal
conviction, however, has made the issue a preoccupation of American
constitutional lawyers and scholars. Since, as we have noted, the influence of the constitutional text on the decisions of that court is often
far from obvious, how can we explain the fact that they are widely
accepted as authoritative statements of supreme law? As will be observed below, few commentators have gone so far as to suggest that
the Court should issue binding constitutional judgments while, at the
same time, forthrightly eschewing any connection between those
judgments and the Constitution. Rather, they have attempted to
reconceive the notion of legal interpretation and thus reconstruct the
relationship between the judge and the constitutional text.
D. JudicialSelf-Restraint and "The Passive Virtues"
Before discussing theories of interpretation as potential restraints on judicial discretion, we should mention an argument offered in the early stages of the present debate which seeks such
restraints in rules of jurisdiction and justiciability, 65 independent of
any particular theory of interpretation. Alexander Bickel called
these justiciability doctrines the "passive virtues",6 6 and saw their
exercise as the most appropriate way to recognize the fact that "judicial review is at least potentially a deviant institution in a democratic
society". 67 His epithet for this problem was "the countermajoritarian
difficulty." 68 In effect, the argument is for extensive invocation of
reasons not to decide a case presenting a constitutional claim, viewing a judgment either way - sustaining or invalidating an act of one
of the political branches - as a significant intervention into the dem69
ocratic process.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring).
See text at supra n. 12 ff. above.
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch ch. 4 (1962).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 129.
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Bickel's first model for this approach was Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 70 in which the majority held
that Congress had constitutional power to create the controversial
Tennessee Valley Authority, a vast government-owned hydroelectric
power company challenged mainly by private companies with which
it competed. Where the majority decided the issue on the merits in
favor of the agency, Brandeis would have achieved the same result by
denying jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs - preferred
shareholders of a private company seeking to invalidate a contract
with the TVA - lacked standing to assert the constitutional claim.
Bickel's second model was Justice Frankfurter, 7 1 a tireless advocate
of staying the Court's hand by the invocation of grounds for not deciding: claimants lack standing, the parties' interests are not sufficiently
adverse, the claim is not yet ripe for decision, it has become moot, the
constitutional question is a "political" one suitable only for resolution
by the elected branches, the statute in question can be narrowly construed so as to avoid the constitutional question, etc.
The point, in Bickel's view, is that the Court lacks the resources
to make and implement social policy, and that its influence in implementing constitutional mandates depends on its capacity to persuade. Interpreting a phrase from Frankfurter, he said:
What is meant ...is that the Court should declare as law
only such principles as will - in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future - gain general assent. . .. The
Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of it, but it
must lead opinion, not merely impose its own; and - the
72
short of it is - it labors under the obligation to succeed.
The most obvious and powerful objection to this sort of argument
is that it presupposes an institutional goal or set of goals for the accomplishment of which the Court's resources are to be husbanded,
without providing clear guidance as to which; 73 it is, in short, open to
equation with expediency and unprincipledness because it can be
made to serve any principle.7 4 Others have argued that many of the
justiciability doctrines, by unduly restricting citizen-initiated chal70. 297 U.S. 288, 341 ff. (1936).
71. For his appraisal of Frankfurter see, e.g., Alexander Bickel, The Supreme
Court and the Idea of Progress 29-39 (1970).
72. Alexander Bickel, supra n. 66, at 239.
73. For a more recent example which does define an institutional goal see Jesse
Choper, Judicial Review and the NationalPolitical Process (1980). He reviewed the
"record of judicial review" and "the record of noncompliance" with its mandates, and
concluded that the Court has a limited "institutional capital" which it should expend
only on the most essential functions ofjudicial review. Specifically, he concluded that
its most essential role was the protection of human rights, and that much of the constitutional law relating to governmental structure - federalism and separation of
powers - could be left to the political process by characterizing them as "political
questions", thereby leaving the Court free to address human rights questions.
74. Bickel openly embraced the term in Bickel, supra n. 66, at 64-72, esp. 71:
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lenges to government action which has only diffuse impact, are inconsistent with an essential role of the Court as articulator and
implementor of constitutional values. 7 5 Further, it is objected that
the public, whose ultimate acceptance of the Court's eventual decisions is the intended purpose of the strategic avoidance, probably
doesn't understand the difference between abstaining and approving,
more likely cares about results than about reasons, and prefers decisions to nondecisions. 76 Nonetheless these pragmatic considerations,
frequently if unpredictably invoked by the Court, should be kept in
mind as we examine theories of interpretation.
III.

SOURCES OF INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE AND THEIR CLAIMS TO
LEGITIMACY

It is impossible in this paper to do full justice to the enormous
literature on constitutional interpretation in the U.S. even of the last
20-30 years. We attempt only a sampling of the principal lines of
argument directed toward identifying appropriate limits on the scope
of judicial construction. It seems most helpful to distinguish two
levels of analysis of the problem: a typology of the sources in fact regularly invoked by the Court or individual justices for interpretive guidance, and a review of the principal contending theories for resolving
conflicts in result suggested by different sources. Recent attempts to
survey the types of sources reach similar though not identical lists;
our organization draws on several. 7 7 It is understood that these arguments are types only, subject to variation in actual cases and most
often used in combination as well as in conflict with each other.
[The techniques for staying the Court's hand] allow leeway to expediency

without abandoning principle. Therefore they make possible a principled
government.

At least one critic, however, failed to see the connection: Gunther, "The Subtle Vices
of the 'Passive Virtues' - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Constitutional
Law," 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
75. See generally Bandes, "The Idea of a Case," 42 Stan. L. Rev. 227 (1990);
Chayes, "Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court," 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4
(1982).

76. For a survey of newspapers editors designed to test some of these hypotheses,
which tended to confirm them, see Haltom & Silverstein, "The Scholarly Tradition
Revisited: Alexander Bickel, Herbert Wechsler, and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review," 4 Const. Comm. 25 (1987).

77. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (1982), listing historical, textual,
structural, doctrinal, prudential and ethical arguments; Fallon, "A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation," 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987), list-

ing arguments from text, adopters' intent, constitutional theory (purposes underlying
particular provisions or arrangements), precedent, and value; Michal Gerhardt &
Thomas Rowe, ConstitutionalTheory: Arguments and Perspectivesch. 2 (1993), listing
text, history, structural reasoning, value choices and moral reasoning, and precedent

as sources of interpretive guidance.
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A. Text
All would agree that the text is the starting point; a claim that
the text alone is sufficient to answer important questions, without
reference to other interpretive guides, is more controversial. Arguments purporting to draw inferences from the text alone take at least
two forms, which present different problems of legitimacy: those
which draw on the plain meaning of specific words and clauses, and
those which seek to identify fundamental values from the text in its
entirety against which the interpretation of specific clauses can be
measured. In any event, such arguments claim their legitimacy from
the premise that "only the text was adopted", that the only act known
voted for the constitution was
to have been shared by all those 7who
8
approval of the particular words.
1. Plain Meaning
Among the earliest examples of this kind of argument is
Chisholm v. Georgia,7 9 holding that the inclusion of the category
"controversies ...between a State and citizens of another State" in
the judicial power (Art. III §2) meant that a state could be sued in
federal court by a citizen of another state on a civil obligation. The
Court reached this conclusion despite evidence that the framers did
not intend to abrogate the common law rule that states cannot be
sued in court without their consent. The majority purported to be
applying the "ordinary rules for construction" and giving primacy to
the text as the authoritative statement of the framers. While the specific holding was reversed by the 11th Amendment, the general interpretive approach was retained and elaborated by the Court in the
Marshall era which shortly followed, especially in cases (the most
prominent) involving the scope of federal powers.8 0
In this century textual literalism is typified by Justice Hugo
Black's dissenting argument in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California81 , objecting to the majority's use of a "balancing test" under the
First Amendment to weigh the interests of the government and that
of a speaker whom the government seeks to suppress, to the
speaker's ultimate disadvantage.8 2 Similarly he argued against the
application of the 4th Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
78. For criticism of this argument see, e.g., Perry, "The Legitimacy of Particular
Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation," 77 Va. L. Rev. 669, 691-2 (1991).
79. Supra n. 30.
80. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819): plain meaning controls unless it produces manifest absurdity or injustice; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 202 (1824): the "enlightened patriots" who framed and adopted the
constitution "must be understood ...to have intended what they said." See also Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 136 ff. (abridgement 1833, repr. 1987).
81. 366 U.S. 36, 61 ff. (1961).
82. See id. at 67-8:
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searches and seizures to wiretapping, on the simple ground that
wiretapping was a form of "eavesdropping" and thus was neither
"searching" nor "seizing" as those terms are commonly understood. 83
Most emphatically, in the latter case, he argued against the Court's
"rewriting" the text in order to adapt it to analogous problems of mod84
ern times.
The notion of a "plain meaning" has a temporal ambiguity: if
there is a difference, does a provision's "common sense" at the time of
adoption control, or that of the time of its application? Justice Black
seemed to suppose the latter, though in his "search and seizure" opinion 8 5 he argued that today's "commonly accepted usage" of the terms
of the Fourth Amendment was consistent both with their meaning at
the time of adoption and with the construction given them by the
Court virtually throughout its history. Justice Story, in his 1833
treatise reflecting the interpretive approach of the Marshall Court,
relegated "contemporary construction" - interpretations roughly
contemporary to the adoption and therefore an important guide to
original understanding - to a secondary status:
It can never abrogate the text; it can never fritter away its
obvious sense; it can never narrow down 86its limitations; it
can never enlarge its natural boundaries.
Two centuries of interpretation and debate, combined with modern sophistication about the meanings and uses of language and
texts, have given rise to very broad skepticism about textual argument of the kind which purports to prefer plain meaning over extratextual aids to interpretation.8 7 While a few participants in
current debates insist that the text -because it does contain a considerable number of essentially unambiguous rules - provides much
The Founders of this Nation attempted to set up a limited government which
left certain rights in the people - rights that could not be taken away without amendment of the basic charter of government. The majority's 'balancing
test' tells us that this is not so. It tells us that no right to think, speak or
publish exists in the people that cannot be taken away if the Government
finds it sufficiently imperative or expedient to do so. Thus, the 'balancing
test' turns our 'Government of the people, by the people and for the people'
into a government over the people.
Justice Black elaborated on his literalist argument both in the media and in an article, Black, "The Bill of Rights," 35 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 865 (1960). For extended excerpts
from a news interview, see Bobbitt, supra n. 77, at pp. 31-36.
83. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 ff. (1966).
84. See also Justice Scalia's dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 ff.
(1990), arguing that the confrontation clause of the 6th Amendment could not be read,
as the majority had, to allow for an exception in the case of a victim accusing an adult
of child abuse; the clause "plainly says all that need be said" on the subject and there
is no room for further balancing of interests.
85. Supra n. 83.
86. Supra n. 80, at 137.
87. For one of many attempts to bring multidisciplinary insights (including "hermeneutics") to bear on the theory of constitutional interpretation, see "Interpretation
Symposium," 58 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1-725 (1985).
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more guidance and restraint in the interpretive process than the
more extreme skeptics acknowledge,8 8 they have been more concerned to counter other specialized theories of interpretation than to
89
defend textualism in its more restricted forms.
2.

Textualist "Interpretivism"

A "common-sense" reading of the text, if limited only by the
grammatically plausible, can be broad as well as narrow, imaginative
as well as literalist. It has been asserted that, as a practical matter,
no theory of interpretation which does not purport to limit the courts
to principles communicated at least indirectly by the constitutional
text can be made plausibly consistent with "modern American political-legal culture" so as to become a serious competitor among theories; 90 but this assertion did not imply serious constraint. Even those
for whom textual terms like "liberty" or "equal protection of the laws"
are not sufficiently broad, and who argue for the appropriateness of
judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights, have been able at least
in recent decades to invoke the 9th Amendment 91 and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 9 2 - despite

88. See Laycock, "Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of the Judicial Review," 59 Tex. L. Rev. 343 (1981); Schauer, "Easy Cases," 58 So. Cal. L. Rev. 399
(1985); Id., "Formalism," 97 Yale L. Rev. 509 (1988); Id., "Constitutional Positivism,"
25 Conn. L. Rev. 797 (1993).
89. Thus Schauer, for example, concerns himself with positivism as a device for
defining law independently of moral content, and is willing to include in the definition
of law precedent and "perhaps other authoritative materials" such as original intent,
authoritative treatises, privileged historical works, practices of certain bodies, etc.: 25
Conn. L. Rev. at 824-5. Laycock too argued only for the text as first source of guidance, and complained of overuse of constitutional legislative history: 59 Tex. L. Rev.
at 360.
90. Perry, supra n. 78, at 688f.
91. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
92. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;...
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judicial neglect959 3 and dismissal 9 4 respectively as warrants for such
consideration.
A prominent example of this potential is the work of John Ely, 96
who insisted on the "interpretivist" position that judicial review
should be limited to "norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the
written Constitution".9 7 He sought, from a reading of the text as a
whole, fundamental values on the basis of which to interpret of the
more open-ended clauses. After rejecting a number of proposed values as either inconsistent with the democratic principle or too indeterminate for general use, 98 he found a "nature of the United States
constitution", namely that of "constituting" a "process of government"
rather than a "governing ideology".9 9 Ely also found a concern for
"policing the process of representation" to be the "deep structure" of
the most important decisions of the Warren Court, 100 after identifying the Burger Court's abortion decision 1° ' as the "clearest example
of noninterpretivist [and therefore illegitimate] 'reasoning' on the
10 2
part of the Court in four decades."
Among the clearest judicial examples of the kind of reasoning on
which Ely relied, ironically enough, was Justice Douglas' majority
93. The Court itself has yet to decide a case in which a majority relied directly on
the 9th; but since Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486 ff. (1965) it has had increased respectability as a warrant for consideration of the possibility of unenumerated rights. On the history and theory of the
9th Amendment see Symposium, "On Interpreting the Ninth Amendment," 64 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 37-268 (1988); Randy E. Barnett (ed.), The Rights Retained to the People:
The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment (1989). Historical rebuttal to a
reading of the provision as recognizing specific unenumerated rights is presented in
McAfee, "The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment," 90 Colum.L. Rev. 1215
(1990).
94. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-81 (1873), holding
that the protection of this clause was limited to a short list of rights relating to the
national government. Since this decision the clause has not been a significant factor
in the Court's work, see John Nowak & Ronald Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw 336 (4th
ed. 1991). For critical analysis of the majority's interpretation, and support for the
dissent in a review of the adoption history, see Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the FourteenthAmendment ch. 3 (1977).
95. See, e.g., John Ely, Democracy and Distrust 22-32 (14th Amendment privileges and immunities) and 33-40 (9th Amendment) (1980); Laurence Tribe & Michael
C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 52-6 (1991).
96. Ely, supra n. 95.
97. Ely, supra n. 95 at 1. That he relies on the text as such seen, for example, in
his reference to the inconclusive legislative history of the 14th Amendment:
It really shouldn't be critical, however. What is most important here, as it
has to be everywhere, is the actual language of the provision that is proposed
and ratified.
Id. p. 27.
98. The judges' own values, natural law, neutral principles, reason, tradition, consensus, and progress are all dismissed with relatively brief treatment, id. at 43-72.
99. Id. ch. 4, esp.'p. 101.
100. Id. at 73 ff.
101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
102. Note 95 above at 2.
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opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,10 3 the principal progenitor of the
abortion decision. Douglas found a right of privacy implicit in a
number of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights (the freedom of association held to be a corollary to the freedom of speech guaranteed in
the First Amendment, the freedom from involuntary billeting of
soldiers in one's house in peacetime expressed in the Third, the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth, the freedom from self-incrimination in the Fifth), found this generalization
supported by a number of prior decisions of the Court, and applied it
to invalidate a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by
married persons. While the opinion has been ridiculed for its unfortunate use of the metaphor of "penumbras, formed by emanations
from these guarantees which help give them life and substance", 10 4 it
represents the same form of generalization of broad principle from
specific textual provisions as that undertaken by Ely.
Almost every aspect of Ely's theory has been criticized, 10 5 especially the discounting of other procedural and substantive values in
the text 0 6 and the use of his "representation-reinforcing" value to
support a broad reading of the text inconsistent with the original intention of the framers.' 0 7 Though his work has stimulated much discussion and debate, he himself admits that it has not had many
adherents.' 08 For our purposes it illustrates the difficulty and extreme controvertability of interpretive methods depending on inferences from "text alone".
B.

OriginalIntent
1. In general

Where the text does not provide a clear answer, a natural next
step is to inquire into the meaning given to it by the people who
adopted it. Reliance on the intent of the constitution-makers as an
interpretive guide has a long history going back at least to the Mar103. Supra n. 93.
104. 381 U.S. at 484.
105. Symposia concentrating on Ely's work are found, for example, in 42 Ohio St.
L. J. #1 (1981) (including discussions of Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National PoliticalProcess (1980)); 77 Va. L. Rev. (1991).
106. See, e.g., Laycock, "Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review," 59 Tex. L. Rev. 343, 361 ff. (1981), finding the procedural value of federalism
(national unity and state sovereignty in tension), as well as many substantive values

equally immanent in the text; Maltz, "Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Comment on Democracy and Distrust,"42 Ohio St. L. J. 209 (1981), noting neglect of
the value of local autonomy. On the inadequacy of purely procedural values see, e.g.,
Tribe, "The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories," 89 Yale
L. J 1063 (1980); Brest, "The Substance of Process," 42 Ohio St. L. Rev. 131 (1981).
107. See, e.g., Berger, "Ely's 'Theory of Judicial Review'," 42 Ohio St. L. J. 87

(1981).
108. See Ely, supra n. 18, at 854 n.57.
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shall period, and can be regarded as a staple of constitutional law. 109
Recently, however, debate has centered on stronger forms of the argument, giving controlling weight to that intent over other sources
and often emphasizing the subjective intentions of the particular persons involved in the constitution-making process. Arguments of this
character, as well as opposition to them, can be found as early as debates in Congress in 1791 over its power to create a national bank. 1 10
An exemplary judicial use of the argument is Hans v. Louisiana,"' where the Court held that the states enjoyed sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of the federal courts in suits brought by
their own citizens. The case was one in which a bondholder sued the
state to recover under a bond which the state had repudiated, claiming that the repudiation violated the federal constitution's prohibition against state laws impairing the obligation of contract. Plaintiff
argued that it was a case "arising under the Constitution", and that
both the Constitution (Art. III §2 cl. 1) and federal statute provided
for jurisdiction in such cases without any qualification as to the identity of the parties. The Court's argument was based on the adoption
history of the 11th Amendment," 2 which concededly did not apply to
the case according to its literal terms because it addressed only suits
against a state by citizens of another state. The argument may be
summarized as follows: the 11th Amendment was adopted specifically to overrule the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia;" 3 this
meant that the framers and ratifiers of that Amendment were in
agreement with the dissent in Chisholm, which had argued that the
constitutional language must be presumed to incorporate the doctrine of immunity; the adoption history of the original constitution the Federalist #81 and the debates in the ratifying conventions, in109. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351 ff. (1816),
invoking "historical facts" to confirm a primarily textual argument, concerning the
ratification debates and the understanding of the first Congress of 1789 which had
many members who had participated in the constitution-making process. See also
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 ff. (1838), citing the text
and the intention of the framers at the convention as primary sources, and proceeding
to sustain the Court's original jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between two
states, against an argument that boundary disputes were excepted from such jurisdiction, on the ground that such disputes were among the most prominent cases of a civil
nature between states at the time of adoption and must therefore have been contemplated by the framers.
110. See the documents excerpted in Jefferson Powell, Languages of Power 37-50
(1991). A similar debate occurred in 1796 over the extent to which the House of Representatives was entitled to participate in treaty making: see Powell, supra n. 11, at
917 ff., who downplays the evidence of commitment to original intent as a controlling
source; Lofgren, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent?," 5 Const. Comm.
77, 94-102 (1988), who finds clear analogs of modem intentionalism.
111. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
112. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
113. Supra n. 30, discussed further in text at n. 79.
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cluding arguments by the future Chief Justice Marshall in the Virginia convention, all addressed to opponents' complaints about the
implications of that textual language - clearly showed an understanding that individual citizens of other states would not be able to
hale a state before the federal courts without its consent; the case of a
citizen suing his own state is not distinguishable in principle from
the one debated; therefore the literal language of the text is to be
read as incorporating the general exception of state sovereign
immunity.114
2.

"Originalism" 1 15

In political and scholarly debate, the strong historical argument
has been pressed with increasing sophistication since the controversial decisions of the Warren Court. Among the leading statements
was one by Robert Bork, writing in 1971 as a professor of law. 1 16 In
terms similar to those discussed above, he asserted that the American constitutional tradition was inconsistent with the making of
value choices by the courts, as institutions not legitimated by popular
election; rather they were to apply value choices made by elected legislators or by the Constitution itself. Measured by that standard, the
entire line of "substantive due process" decisions of the Court - exemplified by Griswold v. Connecticut,1 17 but going back to the beginning of the century when economic interests were protected by this
theory 1 8 - is illegitimate, since none articulates a persuasive theory
based on the constitutional language whereby a minority's preference
is to be protected against that of the majority embodied in legislative
enactment in the particular spheres involved. For Bork, the legisla114. For present-day examples see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), holding that the Court's own interpretive analysis of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment did not apply to the employment of a Christian chaplain by a state
legislature, in view of an unbroken and unchallenged history of the practice dating
back to the very Congress which proposed the Amendment; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), rejecting the claim that prosecution for homosexual sodomy violates
the right of privacy on the basis of virtually universal criminalization of the conduct
from long before adoption to very recent times.
115. The term was used in Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding," 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 204 n.1 (1980), as equivalent to
"interpretivism", covering both textual and historical claims, "as distinguished, for
example, from the interpretation of precedents and social values". He then
distinguished three forms of "originalism": textualism, intentionalism, and
structuralism. We find it helpful to use the term more narrowly, primarily for what
he calls "intentionalism".
116. Bork, supra n. 34.
117. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), holding it a violation of a constitutional right of "privacy"
for the state to prohibit the use of,contraceptives.
118. The leading case was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), holding that a
"freedom to contract" was infringed by regulation of employees' hours and working
conditions. The abandonment of special substantive due process for economic rights,
as unsupported by the text, was announced in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937).
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tive will could be overridden only by the superior will of the constitution-makers. Insisting that this did not mean applying constitutional
limitations only to situations which the framers had foreseen, and
that judges were obligated not to give "crabbed" readings to individual freedoms specified in the text or deny them their "full, fair, and
reasonable meaning", but that overgeneralizations such as Justice
Douglas' in Griswold were equally inappropriate, Bork later used the
following example: if an examination of the evidence of framer understanding of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment
showed that both equal treatment for blacks and a general concern
for racial equality were expressed, but there was no indication that
the adopters thought of equality in,
terms of sexual orientation, there
would be no warrant for applying the clause to inequality premised
on the latter trait. 119 Similarly, he objected to the application of the
equal protection clause, a "specified individual right", to state voting
rights cases, which involve participation in governmental processes,
because the substantive equality principle in that setting was contrary both to the text and to the adoption history of the 14th Amendment, as well as to political practice from colonial times to the
present.120

Originalism equates the Constitution with the will of its creators, so that the interpretation of the text which the original enactors had in mind must prevail over other meanings, however "plain"
the latter may be to the present interpreter. Its principal rationale is
that legitimacy derives from authority. The text must be understood
in law as an expression of some person or persons having authority to
adopt it, an "author"; it is the intention of that author which binds
the judge whose job it is to apply the text to a specific dispute.1 2 1
Only in this way can the judge rely on the legitimacy of the constitution-making act.
Some of the objections to this position are more or less technical.
They deny that it is possible for courts to ascertain the historically
intended meaning of a provision of the text, because the evidence is
too remote and because the relevant intentions are divided among too
many people to allow the distillation of one authoritative intention.
One of the authors of this report has attempted to respond to this
criticism. 122 First,the task is not to determine precisely how the originators would decide a particular case, but to determine which of two
proffered interpretations in a particular case is most likely to coincide
119. Bork, "The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights," 23 San Diego
L. Rev. 823, 827-8 (1986).
120. 47 Ind. L. J. at 18 f.
121. See Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses," 82 N. W. U. L. Rev. 226, 230 (1988); Smith,
"Law Without Mind," 88 Mich. L. Rev. 104, 112 (1989).
122. Kay, supra n. 121, at 236-57.

19941

LEGITIMACY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGE

541

with their understanding of the scope of the relevant rule. Second,
the relevant intentions are those of the ratifiers, those who formally
decided whether the document proposed by the Philadelphia Convention would be put into effect; among them, the shared intentions of
the members of the majorities which effected ratification would control. Though they held different intentions, normally one can begin
with a central paradigm conveyed by the language. 1 23 It would extend to less obvious meanings only on the basis of affirmative evidence of such intention; and in the highly unlikely event that one
could show that two conflicting views were held by the supporters
without a majority for either, neither could be treated as authoritative and the text would be judicially inapplicable. Third, in the unusual case of an inability to establish that any particular
interpretation was more likely supported by the relevant adopters
than another, the Constitution provides some clear "back-up rules" to
resolve such "ties". For example, the federal government (or any one
of its branches) has only those powers granted to it by the constitution and therefore loses such a "tie" where its power is at issue. Conversely, since states have all governmental powers not denied them
by the constitution, they win such a "tie" where their powers are at
issue.
Objections to this view have taken various forms. 124 One is the
above-mentioned difficulty in ascertaining the shared views of persons who acted in large groups over 200 years ago, including, of
course, that of shedding one's own culturally determined biases and
conceptual frameworks in order to put oneself in their intellectual
shoes; 1 25 Justice Scalia, a professed originalist, has emphasized the
intricacy and laboriousness of the task of proper historical inquiry of which there are few examples in Supreme Court opinions - while
preferring the good faith effort at such inquiry over its abandonment
in despair. 126 Another is the claim - vigorously contested as a matter of historical fact - that the framers and ratifiers, at least, did not
expect that their own specific understandings of how the text would
be applied should necessarily control, and that therefore true adherence to their intent would leave room for adaptation to new circumstances with which they might individually disagree. 12 7 Moreover,
123. It is clear that if this is done on the basis of common meanings rather than
ones expressed by members of the relevant group, they must be held as of the time of
ratification.
124. One of the more comprehensive recitals remains Brest, supra n. 115.
125. See the extended caveats associated with the kind of historical inquiry which
appears to be required by originalism in Powell, "Rules For Originalists," 73 Va. L.
Rev. 659 (1987).
126. Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil," 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 856 f. (1989).
127. For different readings of the evidence see, e.g., Powell, supra n. 11, and
Sherry, "The Founders' Unwritten Constitution," 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127 (1987) (finding an understanding that interpreters would not be bound by subjective intent con-
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once the originalist concedes, as some like Judge Bork have done, 128
that it is the task of the judge to make the framers' value choices
relevant to today's problems, so that an appropriate level of generalization must be identified,1 2 9 the theory is opened up to the same
charge of indeterminacy which is made against competing theories.
Perhaps the most fundamental objection voiced against originalism is that firm adherence to it will produce unacceptable results.
This objection necessarily denies the claim that the courts' legitimacy
in overturning majoritarian acts is derived solely from the authority
of the adopters. These objectors insist, rather, that the people who
must now live under the Constitution cannot be bound in this fashion
1 30
by the intentions and limited imaginations of a remote generation.
Justice Scalia, for example, concedes that there are a few likely results of originalist interpretation which he would not expect to follow
as a judge, such as that public flogging is not "cruel and unusual punishment" within the meaning of the 8th Amendment. 1 3 ' Justice
Brennan, in particular, saw the role of the Court in exercising judi1 32
cial review as one of responding to "different historical practices"
in each succeeding generation; for this task, he says, the judge must
always ask what the words mean "in our time".1 3 3 Opponents of
originalism also emphasize the democratic weakness, from the perspective of the present day, of the electoral process in the adoption
period: a decision reached by white male owners of real estate in 1789
may have less claim on today's loyalty than would one reached by a
34
broader-based electorate.'
Ultimately these differences represent a basic disagreement on
the proper design and structure of a legal system.135 The chief policy
argument for originalism is certainty and predictability, that it provides an anchor for interpretation in a specific time and place and
therefore minimizes the effects of changes in values over time. Some
originalists like Bork and Scalia, however, have conceded that original intent is subject to judicial modification in favor of a level of generalization sufficiently high to allow for adaptation to current
cerning specific clauses); Lofgren, supra n. 110, and Kay, supra n. 121 (unpersuaded
that the original understanding was inconsistent with modern originalism).
128. Text at supra nn. 119 f.
129. See also "Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication," 88 Col.
L. Rev. 723, 726 (1988): "The level at which the original understanding is generalized
is decisive in any theory of originalism."
130. Among the most prominent adherents to this view was former Justice Brennan: see, e.g., his speech entitled "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification," reprinted in Jack Rakove (ed.), Interpretingthe Constitution: The
Debate Over OriginalIntent 23-34 (1990). See also Brest, supra n. 115, at 208 f.
131. Scalia, supra n. 126, at 861.
132. Supra n. 130, at 27.
133. Id. See also Michael Perry, Morality Politics and Law 126 f. (1988).
134. Brest, supra n. 115, at 230.
135. See Kay, supra n. 121 above, at 285.
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circumstances, or in favor of particularly strong present-day moral
objection to specific original understandings, or even in favor of the
stability provided by a settled course of judicial decision. 136 For such
theorists a question has been raised whether their view - in a form
likely to be actually employed - presents a satisfactory answer to
the problem of interpretation. 1 3 7 Certainly it is widely agreed that
much of the product of modern constitutional adjudication cannot be
reconciled with ordinary views of the original understanding. Nevertheless, without some form of submission to original intentions, in
light of the difficulties with pure textualism discussed above, legitimation of constitutional adjudication by reference to the constitutional text becomes problematic.
C. Precedent
The difficulty of discerning socially and politically acceptable
rules to govern constitutional adjudication over time, while also
maintaining a firm connection to the constitutional text, might be alleviated by reference to the document as mediated by a developing
body of judicial precedents interpreting it. In the common-law system private law and criminal law was largely developed by the courts
in individual cases relying on prior judicial decisions and opinions as
authority. Consequently, precedent - practice of the government
agencies responsible for implementing the constitution - came as
naturally to the founders as any legal source, even though it is nowhere mentioned in the text. An early judicial example is Stuart v.
Laird,138 in which the Court sustained the congressional practice
(since abandoned) of requiring Supreme Court justices to sit on circuit courts, against the claim that it violated implicit limitations on
the jurisdiction of the Court itself. The Court said:
.. (P)ractice, and acquiescence under it, for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial
system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed
the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the
most forcible nature. The practical exposition is too strong
and obstinate to be shaken or controlled ... a139
As interpretive decisions have accumulated and the adoption of the
text has receded in history, the overwhelmingly predominant source
136. See Monaghan, supra n. 129, at 739 if.; Scalia, supra n. 126, at 861 ("(A)lmost
every originalist would adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis. .. ).
137. Solum, "Originalism as Transformative Politics," 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1599 (1989).
138. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
139. 5 U.S. at 299. James Madison also believed that practice can settle an issue of
interpretation, see Powell, supra n. 11, at 939-41; Drew McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy 79-82 (1989).
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of authority for the Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitution has indeed become its own previous opinions. 14 0
The primary arguments in favor of relying on judicial precedent
are institutional economy, fairness and predictability toward those
who must conform their future conduct to constitutional requirements, increased motivation to give full consideration to each decision because of its broader impact, improved protection against
political influence. 14 1 Because the prior cases involve specific fact situations and the opinions are rendered with the benefit of focused advocacy on all sides, they may afford better guidance, both for the
Court and for persons subject to the rules stated in them, than the
framers' articulation of general principles; analogical reasoning remains the most familiar and comfortable method for judges in a common-law tradition. 142 Thus it is argued that proper respect for prior
decisions is an important element in that judicial restraint which
helps support the legitimacy of the Court's work. 143 It has frequently
been characterized as an important element of the "rule of law".'"
On the other hand it is often recognized that it is more difficult for
the people to overrule an incorrect (or unacceptable) decision on a
constitutional question (the amendment process is the only direct
method), than it is with decisions applying ordinary law (which can
be overridden by legislation), and that therefore the Court should be
14 5
more open to correcting its own mistakes.
The result of weighing these policy considerations, at least in
very recent times, has been a pragmatic treatment of precedent. Its
disharmony with the ideal of the judge who finds law but doesn't
make it, is exemplified by decisions on when and how to overrule a
prior case. These decisions purport to be based on a balance between
the degree of reliance disputing actors may have placed on the prior
law and the strength of the policy underlying the new interpretation.146 Especially telling are decisions in which the Court promul140. This statement can be verified by a quick perusal of any opinion of the Court
picked at random from the last 50 years.
141. See Monaghan, supra n. 129, at p. 744.
142. Monaghan, supra n. 129, at 758 f.
143. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 674 (1961 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992)
(O'Connor, J.).
145. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 408 (1932 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); cf. Monaghan, supra n. 129, at 762 f.
146. On overruling, the Court struck the balance in favor of a new interpretation in
a criminal evidence case, Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991), but in favor of
reliance in the latest abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992). The leading case on prospective overruling
is Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); it is now held that selective retroactivity based on case-by-case evaluation of reliance is inconsistent with the requirement of equal treatment, see Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 113 S.Ct.
2510 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991); Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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gates a new interpretation, which it expressly holds applicable only
to situations arising in the future. In one such prospective overruling
case, Justice Scalia expressed the restraintist objection to this
approach:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they
make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they
were 'finding' it - discerning what the law is, rather than
decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will to47
morrow be.'
In terms of a legitimacy tied to the Constitution, of course, each intervening layer of judicial elaboration attenuates that critical connection. At some point, it may be essential to remember that, as Justice
Frankfurter said, "[t]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the constitution itself and not what we have said about it."148
D. Structural Argument 14 9 and "Functionalism"
A further recognized method of interpretation, whereby courts
are able to adapt the Constitution to what they perceive to be modern
exigencies, is to seek guidance not from specific clauses but from the
structure of government created by the document as a whole. The
primary domain of structural argument, of course, is in the areas of
federalism and separation of powers, both principles which are
staples of constitutional law but which are found in the text only by
implication. This approach can be traced back at least as far as Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,150 articulating
the expansive view of the scope of the specific powers granted in the
Constitution to the national government. This determination was defended as implied in the document as a whole insofar as it created a
15 1
central government with broad purposes and functions.
147. Scalia, J., in James B. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2450 (emphasis in original). See
also his concurrence in Harper, 113 S.Ct. at 2522: "Prospective decisionmaking is the
handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis."
148. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1938) (concurring opinion).
149. Credit for the label and for the modern articulation is given to Charles Black,
Structure and Relationship in ConstitutionalLaw (1969); see Bobbitt, supra n. 77, ch.
6; Gerhardt & Rowe, supra n. 77, at 130f.
150. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
151. See also Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§183 at p. 136 (abridgement 1833, repr. 1987):

In construing the constitution of the United States, we are, in the first instance, to consider, what are its nature and objects, its scope and design, as
apparentfrom the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and also

viewed in its component parts. Where its words are plain, clear, and determinate, they require no interpretation; and it should, therefore, be admitted, if
at all, with great caution, and only from necessity, either to escape some absurd consequence, or to guard against some fatal evil. (emphasis added)
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The modern significance of this approach has been seen, for example, in recent decisions involving federal-state 15 2 and legislativeexecutive153 relationships respectively. The federalism cases first established and then abandoned a "state sovereignty" exception to the
power of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce,
which precluded application of such regulations to economic activities
of state and local governments when that would adversely affect the
ability of the states to perform their sovereign functions. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the first decision and wrote the majority
opinion in the last, but was the only one agreeing with both; he found
in the last case that the first decision's attempt at formulating standards for applying the state immunity had proved in intervening decisions to be unworkable and that no further effort could succeed.
Therefore, the state sovereignty exception had to be abandoned in
favor of reliance on the political process for protection of the states.
The argument in favor of the exception, though it cited a specific provision as a limitation on the granted power,' 5 4 has been more properly seen as an implicit structural argument generalizing from
numerous provisions presupposing vital state governments. 155 The
argument against it reflects discomfort with overly interventionist jurole
dicial review 156 but is criticized as neglect of an essential judicial
157
in the preservation of constitutionally recognized institutions.
In the separation of powers cases two firm rules have been
drawn from the general distribution of authority in the Constitution:
(i) that Congress may take binding action toward persons and institutions external to itself only through formal legislation, and (ii) that
Congress may not assign executive functions to itself or its agents.
152. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Usery had itself
overruled a decision less than ten years old, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
153. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), invalidating the so-called "legislative veto", a type of statutory provision giving one or
both Houses of Congress power to disapprove of particular executive or administrative decisions authorized by the statute, without such disapproval itself following the
procedure for enacting new legislation; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), invalidating a statute giving an officer answerable directly to the congress a participatory
role in executing the rather complex statutory scheme for budgetary control; Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, 111 S.Ct. 2298 (1991), invalidating the delegation of veto power over decisions
of an administrative agency to a "review board" consisting of Congressmen appointed
on the basis of their legislative committee assignments.
154. The 10th Amendment, reserving to the states and to the people all powers not
granted by the constitution to the federal government.
155. Bobbitt, supra n. 77, at 74-5.
156. Field, "The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
TransitAuthority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine," 99 Harv. L. Rev. 84, esp. 89
f. (1985), likening National League of Cities to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), the case which launched economic substantive due process.
157. Van Alstyne, "The Second Death of Federalism," 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709 (1985).
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The most dramatic example is the so-called "legislative veto" case, 158
in which a statutory device of long standing and wide use,' 5 9
designed to enable Congress to take advantage of administrative expertise in specialized subject-matters while exercising a more effective oversight over the agencies' discretion, was struck down because
the "veto" itself, 160 as distinguished from the statute authorizing it,
by definition did not follow the constitutional procedures for enacting
legislation. 16 1 In each of these cases a structuralist or "functionalist"
argument 16 2 would take the current working relationships among the
constitutional institutions into account in interpreting the specific
rules set forth in the document, 16 3 whereas a "formalist" approach
leads to more rigid application of the rules at the expense of disturbing those relationships; in each, formalism appears to have won
out.
The chief advantage of structural argument is that it allows consideration of the practical effect of applying specific limiting rules on
the normal functioning of governmental institutions in light of the
overall scheme of government envisioned by the Constitution.16 4 Its
chief difficulty from the perspective of legitimacy, illustrated by the
above examples, is indeterminacy: how is one to determine, without
arbitrary discretion, when the practical functioning of an institution
in the present environment requires a flexible reading of explicit textual provisions? 65 Such pliability necessarily obscures the connection between the decision and the document as its legitimating
source.

E. Argument from Extratextual Values
The most controversial sources of guidance for interpretation of
the more open-ended provisions of the Constitution, of course, are
those which are not fairly attributable either to the text, or to an understanding articulated in the founding period, or to an established
line of precedent. The Court has been willing, from time to time, to
rely explicitly on extratextual "fundamental values," though it is frequently noted that such bases of decision are most often either unac158. Chadha, supra n. 153.
159. It had been first proposed by President Hoover over 50 years earlier, and was
incorporated in more than 200 statutes still in force at the time of the decision, see
462 U.S. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
160. Usually a resolution adopted by one or both houses of Congress or by one or
committees thereof, approving or disapproving of agency action.
161. Art. I § 7: approval by vote of each house and presentment to the President for
approval or veto.
162. See Strauss, "Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions - A Foolish Inconsistency?," 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987).
163. Justice White's dissent in Chadha, 462 U.S. at 978 ff., is an excellent example.
164. See Bobbitt, supra n. 77, at p. 85.
165. See, e.g., Blasi, "Creativity and Legitimacy in Constitutional Law," 80 Yale L.
J. 176 (1970).
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knowledged or accompanied by other more traditional arguments.166
The clauses invoked in connection with such values are most often
the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments, prohibiting
federal and state governments from depriving persons of life, liberty
or property "without due process of law". It is common to such arguments that they assume an evolving Constitution whose democratic
legitimacy is derived from something other than - or more precisely
in addition to - the formal ratification of the text by the prescribed
supermajorities. Rather, they assume a widely shared commitment
proven in other ways. Moreover, it is rarely claimed that extratextual values should take precedence over other sources when these
provide a clear answer; rather it is sought to show that the Court has
often invoked them, and to articulate a conception of judicial review
which accommodates such a practice with the "countermajoritarian
difficulty."
1. History and Tradition
Judicial debate over the permissibility of resort to extratextual
values is found at least as early as Calderv. Bull, 16 7 in which Justice
Chase and Justice Iredell exchanged obiter dicta for and against invalidation of state laws on natural law grounds. The justices have
been more comfortable over the years, however, with a variant of the
argument from history. A favorite modern example is Moore v. City
of East Cleveland,168 which invalidated a city ordinance restricting
"single-family" residence zones to a nuclear family and excluding, in
the particular case, a grandmother living with her two grandsons
who were not brothers but cousins. Justice Powell, speaking for a
four-vote plurality, said:
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.
It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down
69
many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.1
He relied for his standard principally on the dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan - a conservative devotee of the passive virtues this
time dissenting from a decision to avoid - arguing in an early contraceptives case' 70 that a prohibition against the use of contracep166. See, for example, the analysis of the Cherokee Cases, especially Worcester v.

Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), in Bobbitt, supra n. 77, at 116 ff., in which state
laws purporting to dissolve and outlaw the Cherokee nation are invalidated on the
basis of treaties between the federal government and the Cherokees - but not by
reason of conflict with specific provisions of treaties so much as with the status of
federal protectorate represented by the treaties.
167. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 398 (1798).
168. 431 U.S. 534 (1977).
169. 431 U.S. at 503.
170. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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tives by married persons is an intolerable invasion of privacy.
Harlan, in turn, had invoked precedents going back to Calder purporting to interpret various clauses of the Constitution, but especially
the term "liberty" in the due process clauses., as protecting those fundamental rights which "belong to the citizens of all free governments"
against "substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." In speaking of those cases as seeking a balance between
individual liberty and the demands of organized society, Harlan said:
[The] balance [is] struck by this country, having regard to
what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which
radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.
No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judg17 1
ment and restraint.
Harlan, at least, saw restraint in that concept of tradition, 172 and
Powell relied on it to distinguish a case prior to Moore which had
sustained an ordinance which had drawn the single-family line at
blood or marital relationship. 173
A principal objection to this variant is the familiar one of indeterminacy, leaving room for the justices' personal preferences to take
actual control: what counts as a tradition, and how is it to be proven?
2.

"Prophecy", "Contemporary Ratification" and
"Constitutional Moments"

A number of theorists go beyond tradition to a more self-conscious judicial role in identifying and developing fundamental values.
The most prominent judicial spokesman for this view in recent times
was Justice Brennan, who insisted that the Court seeks to speak for
its own community and generation in performing the task of interpretation which is public, obligatory and burdened with practical consequence; he spoke of "contemporary ratification" of the Constitution as
interpreted. 174 Indeed he argued that an adaptive interpretation is
essential to the Constitution's continued vitality, given the difficulty
of formal amendment.
Alexander Bickel1 75 saw the passive virtues as essential to a
"prophetic" role for the Court, an educational role which can only be
171. 367 U.S. at 542.
172. When a majority of the Court finally was willing to address the issue in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra n.93, Harlan's concurring opinion chided Douglas' majority opinion for failing to restrict its rationale to traditional values.
173. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
174. Note 130 above, esp. pp. 27 ff. See also Holmes, J., in Missouri v. Holland, 262
U.S. 416, 433 ff. (1920).
175. Supra n.66, at 239.
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performed by an agency with their "insulation and the marvelous
mystery of time"; 176 Michael Perry expanded that concept to one of
judicial review as "the institutionalization of prophecy," in which the
Court calls the government to "provisional judgment" as representatives of the people. 177 A "dialectical" 178 relationship exists between
judiciary and elected officials, in Perry's view, in which the various
controls which the latter have over the former are at least cumulatively sufficient 79 to give legitimacy by acquiescence to what in fact
amounts to the expression of the justices' own moral visions. 180 In a
later work Perry gave a somewhat more refined invocation of the religious analogy, noting three elements of the interpretive or "prophetic" role: community, tradition (defined as the community's
aspirations), and a foundational text;' 8 ' he also conceded that our
legal tradition demands that extratextual values be at least signified
by the text, although he insisted that many of its provisions do signify fundamental aspirations of our society. 182 Other authors have
developed similar ideas of an interpretive community with which the
83
judiciary engages in a continuing exchange.
A related analysis by Bruce Ackerman 8 4 acknowledges that the
political expression which attains the level of constitution-making 8 5
is of a special kind which occurs only rarely. He insists, however,
that it can occur in forms other than the formal ratification of specific
texts. Ackerman maintains that this has occurred twice (and only
twice) in our history: the post-Civil War period of Reconstruction and
the New Deal of the 1930's. Each involved broad-based political action specifically focused on constitutional arrangements as currently
understood, achieving consensus on fundamental values comparable
176. Id. at 26.
177. Michael Perry, The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights at 98-9
(1982).
178. Id. at 113.
179. In his first book he argued, after a review of those we have mentioned in our
introduction, that the one control that is realistic in relation to particular decisions as distinguished from those which affect the institution as a whole or are too cumbersome to mobilize often - is that of controlling jurisdiction, id. at pp. 126-139. In his
later work, perhaps responding to reviews of the first which focused on this point (e.g.,
Alexander, "Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review," 8 U.
Dayton L. Rev. 447, 455-7 (1983)), he invokes the cumulative effect of all controls, but
especially the appointment and amendment powers, as historically effective, Perry,
supra n.133, at 168-9.
180. Supra n.177, at 123.
181. Perry, supra n. 133, at 136-7.
182. Id. at 133 ff.
183. See, e.g., Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation," 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982).
184. Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1991).
185. He calls the American system a "dualist democracy", in which decisions are
made by two agencies: the people and the government; the former engages in "higher
lawmaking" and the latter in "ordinary lawmaking". Id. at p. 6.
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to that of the ratifiers of 1788 and justifying judicial implementation
86
of those values even though not clearly manifested in a legal text.'
The concept of a prophetic role for the Court as justifying judicial
application of extratextual fundamental values is vulnerable at at
least two points beyond the indeterminacy which it shares with all
other theories of interpretation. First and foremost, there is objection
to the assumption that the justices have any superior skills at identifying such values which justify allowing their judgments to prevail in
a democratic system;' 8 7 judicial "prophecy" is characterized by Ackerman as "flatly inconsistent with the principles of dualist democracy." 18 Further, one may dispute the assumption that the polity's
opportunities for correcting judicial mistakes are sufficient to reconcile such review with the democratic system, or to prevent "judicial
tyranny". 189
F.

Eclectic Theories

Finally we must mention some theorists who embrace all the
above-mentioned forms of argument and offer more or less flexible
guidelines for resolving conflicts between them. Philip Bobbitt has
identified six "modalities" of argument (textual, historical, doctrinal,
structural, prudential and "ethical") which he observes the Court
utilizing with sufficient frequency and acceptance to justify their
characterization as "legitimate". 190 No one of these "modalities", in
his view, can be determinate enough to constrain the judges and also
comprehensive enough to decide all cases; they are conventions or
practices, each with its own constraints, but they are not verifiable
statements of fact about an objective constitution, so that neither the
"strict constructionist" insisting on the primacy of one source nor the
"reconstructionist" seeing only politics fully understands the nature
of legal reasoning. 19 1 Legitimacy, he argues, derives from the proper
use of one or more of these modalities to rationalize a decision; what
distinguishes legal interpretation from literary interpretation is the
judges' obligation to reach a decision. 19 2 Finally he asserts that there
is no overarching rule or value governing the choice among "modalities" for a particular case, only the consciences of the judges:
186. The argument for viewing Brown and Griswold as synthesis and interpretation rather than prophecy is developed in id. at 140-62.
187. See, e.g., Kay, "Moral Knowledge and Constitutional Adjudication," 63 Tul. L.
Rev. 1501 (1989).
188. Ackerman, supra n. 184, at 139.
189. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue:A CriticalAnalysis of Constitutional Law 198-202 (1988).
190. Supra n. 77, passim.
191. Philip Bobbitt, ConstitutionalInterpretationat 31 ff. (1991).
192. Id. at 39.
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.(T)he US Constitution does not endorse communal values,
nor, with the single exception [of respect for individual conscience], particular individual values. ...(T)hus when a constitutional decision is made, its moral basis is confirmed if
the forms of arguments can persuasively rationalize the decision, and the decision is not made on grounds incompatible
with the conscience of the decisionmaker. That is constitutional decision according to law. 193
Richard Fallon 9 4 offers a similar typology of accepted forms of
argument, 19 5 as well as a set of criteria for judging the usefulness of
any theory about how those arguments should be used. The criteria
for judging are whether the theory accurately describes modern practice, whether it is neither too rigid nor too indeterminate, and
whether it recognizes the interdependence of the various factors (for
example, that value judgments are pervasive in all constitutional argument). He notes three types of theory currently supported, all of
which he considers inadequate by the above criteria: those which
privilege a single factor, such as originalism; those which deny the
existence of any rules governing choice among factors; and those
which prescribe a weighing and balancing of all factors in each case.
His own theory he labels "constructive coherence": like Bobbitt, he
presupposes that all of the forms of arguments on his list are in regular use and therefore are legitimate; he observes that as the individual judges use them, they seldom find actual conflict between them;
he proposes, therefore, that the actual practice of the typical judge is
to begin with a more or less intuitive judgment about what result is
"right", but to seek a result which most plausibly fits all the forms of
argument. If there is in fact an unavoidable conflict between the different factors, he suggests as the most likely hierarchy the following,
in descending order: text, original intent, theory or purpose, precedent, and value; the descent stops at that factor at which (in light of
the higher ones) clarity is achieved in how to resolve the issue. Because all of the factors or forms are indeterminate to one degree or
another, they are all candidates for accommodation with each other;
because judges are given training and a process which promotes reflection and the art of reasoned explanation, they are peculiarly well
qualified, in his view, to do this job.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The exercise of constitutional judicial review by American courts
has, as noted, not always been received with favor or even respect by
193. Id. at 169.
194. Fallon, supra n. 77.
195. They are: text, framers intent, theory (the purposes of particular provisions or
arrangements), precedent, and (moral, social and political) values.
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the rest of the national political and social community. 19 6 For the
most part, however, the history of judicial review has been one of extraordinary success. As we indicated at the outset, the courts, in the
exercise of judicial review, have had an enormous influence on the
formulation of critical issues of national policy. That success could
only be possible if the courts are regarded as legitimate decisionmakers. The fact of that legitimacy is beyond question. The explanation of it, however, remains, after all the theoretical work
canvassed, still elusive.
Each of the theories of interpretation put forward has been subject to serious criticism and each, for reasons which have been mentioned, remains unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of political
legitimacy. Even the most restrictive of them is liable to manipulation and, therefore, to a significant measure of indeterminacy. To the
extent that the legitimacy of the process depends on the perception
that the judges act not on the basis of their own moral or political
convictions, but on some pre-existing source of authority, it is undermined by such manipulability. Each of these models, moreover, exhibits a varying degree of distance from the self-evidently legitimate
constitutional text. It is perhaps an irony of American constitutional
theory, that what a conception of judicial review gains in legitimacy
by observable adherence to the constitutional text and history, it may
lose because of the irrelevance of that static history and text to the
changing problems presented by modern litigation, and of the unwillingness or inability of judges in courts of last resort to submit to these
constraints.
In the end, we can only speculate that a happy combination of
factors - the selection process which inevitably produces justices
well steeped in the mainstream of political and legal thinking, the
process of litigation which limits the occasions on which the constitutional judge may pronounce, the sense of caution and restraint which
periodically leads to a retrenchment in judicial activity, and the public and academic debate on the propriety of judicial intervention,
which itself at least indirectly influences the products of judicial review - all contribute to an inarticulate acceptance of the role of the
courts. That acceptance has developed notwithstanding - indeed
maybe because of - the fact that it cannot be clearly conceptually
justified.

196. The most notorious example is the Dred Scott case, Scott v. Sanford, supra n.
31 above, one of the precipitating causes of the Civil War.

